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Productivity analyses focus on either efficiency or effectiveness. This paper provides a step-wise approach 
for evaluating utility performance. In a first step, utilities’ technical efficiency is estimated. In a second 
step, we examine utilities’ effectiveness in meeting existing customer demands for drinking water services 
within their licensed jurisdiction. The difference between inefficiency and ineffectiveness is decomposed in 
a third step. A final step explores country specific (e.g., income per capita), sector specific (e.g., regulation) 
and utility specific (e.g., density economies) inefficiency and ineffectiveness determinants. The four steps 
are applied to the African drinking water utilities. The results indicate that the utilities face technical 
inefficiency rather than ineffectiveness challenges. This is consistent across the various African regions. 
Economic development is positively and significantly associated with increased technical efficiency and 
effectiveness levels. 
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The natural monopolistic nature of the urban water sector and the recent organizational and 
institutional developments across the sector in most developing countries urge for productivity 
assessments in the sector. For water utilities, as with any other company or utility, it is imperative 
to operate efficiently and effectively.  
 
Following Farrell (1957), a utility’s overall efficiency is a product of both allocative efficiency 
and technical efficiency.2 This paper focuses on the latter and defines (technical) efficiency as the 
equiproportionate physical output expansion with given (physical) inputs.3 Utilities’ effectiveness 
reflects the extent to which sector objectives are met within each utility’s licensed jurisdiction. In 
other words besides obtaining a maximal output with the given resources (i.e., efficiency), utility 
managers need to universally meet their customer demands for quality (i.e., non-contaminated) 
and reliable (constant daily flow) water supply services (i.e., effectiveness). 
 
Effectiveness can loosely be stated as ‘doing the right things’. The need for effectiveness is made 
clear by looking at service delivery levels. By 2006, African urban water utilities only delivered 
water to about 65 percent of the population within their licensed jurisdiction (WSP-WB, 2009). 
This is low when compared to other developing regions that served on average 73 (East Asia and 
Pacific region), 85 (Central Asia region) and 85 (Latin America and the Caribbean region) 
percent of their urban populations with safe piped water services in 2006 (WSP-WB, 2009). This 
paper examines whether utility managers in the different African countries (can) meet the demand 
for qualitative and reliable water supply.  
 
Efficiency can loosely be stated as ‘doing things right’. The call for an efficient use of inputs is 
clear when one looks at utilities’ costs and revenues. At the cost side and owing to the increasing 
multi-sectoral competition for the shrinking renewable water resources, production costs are 
increasing over time (AfDB-WPP, 2010; UNESCO and Earthscan, 2009). At the revenue side, 
water utilities often incur low cost-recovery levels as most user tariffs are centrally regulated 
(Madhoo, 2007). Albeit increasing costs and decreasing revenues do not influence efficiency 
directly, but they create pressure on utility managers to use their existing inputs in a better and, 
thus, more efficient way. This paper explores to what extent utility managers are using their 
inputs to produce outputs. That is if utilities would produce as efficiently as the best practice 
observation(s), how much more outputs would they produce with their given inputs?  
 
This paper proposes an approach to measure efficiency and effectiveness trends over time. We 
rely on productivity analysis techniques that enable us to identify utilities’ efficiency and 
                                                 
2 For more information on how these components are decomposed when either output maximization or cost 
minimization objectives are considered, see also Fried et al. (2008).   
3 Or physical input minimization for a given (physical) output level - in the alternative case where policy makers aim to 
minimize firms inputs for a given output level. 
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effectiveness. We further decompose utilities’ ineffectiveness from inefficiency. This enables us 
to identify the highest (and lowest) performing water utilities (hereafter WUs). Moreover, it 
allows us to identify specific performance improvement areas that can potentially inform and 
facilitate sector restructuring, reorganization and targeted decision making (on tariffs, quality 
standards) while limiting inevitable sector conflicts (Berg, 2007), adverse selection and moral 
hazard incentive problems (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). To further explain WU’s performance, the 
influence of different environmental factors on WUs’ efficiency and effectiveness levels is 
explored. Here, we consider different national, sector and utility specific environmental factors 
that are beyond the control of WU managers but potentially influence managers’ abilities to 
transform fixed inputs into controllable outputs. 
 
We focus on the African urban water sector that has incurred increased organizational and 
institutional restructuring since the 1990s. Among other objectives, these reforms aim at 
improved utility efficiency and effectiveness (Estache and Kouassi, 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 
2006; AfDB-WPP, 2010; Mwanza, 2010). Subsequently, most African urban water sectors are 
governed by similarly orchestrated water legislations that define the respective key sector 
mission(s) and provide clear mandates (regarding service provision, regulation and policy 
making, among others) for the different sector stakeholders.  
 
Across the African continent, urban piped water services are largely provided by public 
companies, either by the central government (e.g., in Eritrea), state owned agencies (Uganda and 
Ghana), full fledged water departments within local authorities (Namibia, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe) or public companies owned by municipalities (Kenya and Zambia; see WHO and 
UNICEF, 2000). A few African countries (including Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Mozambique, Niger and Senegal) engage private actors through contractual arrangements other 
than service and management contracts (Mwanza, 2010). Following the commercialization 
reforms across most of these countries nonetheless, utilities are expected to operate efficiently -
that is, expand outputs with given inputs. Moreover, utilities are required to work effectively: to 
reach their target in the form of complete coverage with quality and reliable water services for all 
customers within their licensed service areas.   
 
 
Efficiency and effectiveness, and especially their interdependence in the context of the African 
urban water sector, have been explored only diminutively in previous literature. Exceptions are 
studies by Estache and Kouassi (2002) and Kirkpatrick et al. (2006). Using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, Estache and Kouassi found the public owned African urban WUs less 
efficient than the privately-owned utilities. The latter (compared to the former) utilities were 
found less corrupt and well governed. They observed a total of 21 (18 public, 3 private) utilities 
between 1995 and 1997. Kirkpatrick et al. did not observe any efficiency differences between 
publicly and privately-owned African urban WUs. They compared results from both parametric 
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(Cobb-Douglas cost function) and non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis, hereafter DEA) 
techniques on 14 utilities. Both studies quantified inefficiency between the publicly and privately-
owned urban WUs. 
 
For most public sectors (education, water supply, etc.), explicit market price information is 
missing or unreliable. In such cases, productivity analyses examine the extent to which utilities 
can technically increase their delivered outputs with given physical resources. Utilities’ efficiency 
is then estimated against a frontier of best practice observations. In other words, with or without 
market price information, public utilities are supposed to operate efficiently and not waste scarce 
resources in such production process (Pestieau and Tulkens, 1993). 
 
As for the African urban WUs, there might exist significant measurement error in the data. To 
mitigate the influence of measurement errors in a nonparametric framework, we determine a 
frontier consisting of best practice companies by the use of a double bootstrap technique based on 
the truncated maximum likelihood estimators (Simar and Wilson, 2007).4 The double bootstrap 
approach permits the estimation of bias-corrected technical efficiency scores (with the bias 
arising from possible measurement errors) and allows for the examination of efficiency 
covariates. We distinguish various influences that characterize the observed utilities’ operating 
environments. Identified inefficiency and ineffectiveness sources form the basis on which future 
performance improvement policies at the macro (country), meso (sector) and micro (utility) levels 
can be formulated.  
 
We further disentangle utilities’ ineffectiveness from inefficiency. We measure to what extent 
utilities are able to achieve their differently prioritized effectiveness goals for all customers 
within their licensed service areas. To do so, as noted in Lovell et al. (1995), it is necessary to 
aggregate all indicators into a single performance index. The latter helps us to summarize the 
multi-faceted goals into a single performance measure that is easy to interpret and easily useful to 
sector regulators and utility managers among other interested stakeholders, in designing and 
enforcing appropriate performance improvement policy strategies (Saisana and Tarantola, 2002).  
 
To examine utilities effectiveness, we advocate a ‘Benefit of the Doubt’ (hereafter BoD) analysis 
(Melyn and Moesen, 1991; Cherchye et al., 2007). This non-parametric technique aggregates 
observed effectiveness sub-indicators into utility-specific performance indexes. The data rely on 
the Water Operators Partnership (WOP) dataset. This rich dataset forms part of the WOP-Africa 
self assessment and benchmarking exercise facilitated by the Water and Sanitation Program 
(WSP) in 2006 across 134 African WUs (WSP-WB, 2009). WOP-Africa is part of the Global 
WOP Alliance provided by the Hashimoto Action Plan (UNSGAB, 2006). The latter was 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, one could estimate a (semi-)parametric frontier as Stochastic Frontier Analysis (see for e.g., Greene, 
2008 for a discussion). However, as we do not have any a priori information on the specification of the production 
frontier, we rely only on non-parametric techniques.   
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launched at the fourth World Water Forum (2005) and endorsed by the United National 
Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Central to the WOP’s initiative is 
the improvement of utilities’ productivity (efficiency and effectiveness) mainly through peer-to-
peer technical support partnerships.  
 
Interestingly, the data collects homogenous information on the different production variables 
across African urban WUs. However, only quantity information on utilities water supply 
(distribution mains length, output levels, etc.) is consistently reported. Most observed utilities had 
some level of outsourcing through service contracts but detailed information on these contracts is 
unavailable. Nonetheless, such outsourcing is likely infinitesimal and homogenously spread-out 
across observed utilities. To further avoid data incompatibilities, only quantity vectors that are 
less prone to national fiscal (exchange rates) heterogeneities are used.  
 
This paper unfolds as follows. The next sections discuss the analytical framework and empirical 
model. Subsequently, the study findings are described and discussed in section four while, section 




2 Analytical framework 
In assessing utilities’ performance, binary (partial productivity) ratios of output to input are often 
used. Binary ratios are preferred as they are easy to measure and to understand. Nonetheless, they 
face a number of limitations (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). First, binary measures compare different 
utilities against a single indicator while ignoring other equally important and/or competing 
indicators. Second, they do not take into account any heterogeneity across utilities and compare 
firms assuming constant returns to scale. By construction, small-scaled utilities appear less 
productive than the large-scaled utilities on variables with scale economies (and vice versa for 
variables with diseconomies of scale). Besides, due to Fox’s paradox, lower values for all 
considered binary combinations do not necessarily imply low total productivity for a specific 
utility since utility managers can as well utilize sub-processes that have relatively higher 
productiveness than others (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). 
 
Multidimensional frontier techniques provide an endogenously weighted approach where an 
entity is compared to a best practice. To estimate the technology set (or frontier of the best 
practice observations), two benchmarking approaches are presented in the literature. Econometric 
frontier models define a priori functional form on the data (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, Translog, 
Fourier). This is rather problematic as the functional form is often unknown and a wrong 
specification could lead to biased results (Yatchew, 1998). Non-parametric models (including, 
DEA) do not assume a functional form on the data, are flexible and easy to compute through 
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linear programming techniques, but are deterministic in nature (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker, 
1984).  
 
To overcome the deterministic nature of DEA, this paper applies a DEA approach based on a 
double-bootstrap procedure. The bootstrap approach is preferred as it yields consistent and robust 
estimators (Kneip et al., 2003). Since it is unlikely that WUs have control over their operational 
scales except through acquisitions that have to be approved by a government institute, the paper 
at hand assumes variable returns to scale (hereafter VRS). In a first step, DEA estimators are used 
to estimate the reference unobserved true production technology. For observed utilities, DEA 
assumes a production technology which transforms non-negative M x 1 inputs (x) into S x 1 
output (y) vectors (Coelli et al., 2005). The production technology set (T) for N WUs (i = 1, 2, 
3,…,N) can be defined as:  
   y producecanx;iy;ix:iy,ix T 00                                                          [1] 
 
 
T is unobserved but we can estimate )ˆ(T  by the DEA estimators. The utilities are assumed to 
maximize their outputs with the given inputs. Moreover, given the prevailing need to halve by 
2015 the number of persons without access to sustainable safe water systems, it is likely that 
African WUs prioritize outputs expansion. An output distance function (equation 2) defined on an 
equivalently denoted (as the production technology set T) output set {P(xi)}5 is used to estimate 
WUi’s technical efficiency )ˆˆ( iET .6  
 
   )ix(P)ˆ/iy,ix(:  miniy,ixoD   0                                                                   [2] 
 
  iyixoD ,  represents the maximal radial expansion of specific outputs given existing resources. 
Utilities on the best practice frontier are considered technically efficient (or effective) while those 
located within the frontier are considered as technically inefficient (or ineffective). The distance 
ˆ  estimates the output shortfall reflected by the euclidean distance to the boundary of the 
production frontier from WUi, in a direction parallel to the output axes and orthogonal to the 
input axes (Daraio and Simar, 2007). 
 
DEA-VRS considers the following optimization problem that is solved for each of the N utilities 
(i = 1,2,3…N) in T periods (t = 1, 2, 3… T): 
                                                 
5 Algebraically expressed as TiyixiyyproducecanxiyixP  ),(:}:{)( . )( ixP denotes the set of all output 
vectors (y) that can be produced by use of a given input (x) vector. 





max       i                                                                                          [3] 
        Constraints:      ,0 iYiyi   
           ,0 ixiX  
      ;0i 1 i  
 
 
Where i  is a scalar variable that approximates WUi’s technical efficiency (1/ i ). iy  is the 
output vector for WUi while Y is the output matrix for all N WUs in a given time period. i  
represents the non-negative weights while X  is the input quantities’ vector for all N WUs. ix  is 
the input quantities vector for WUi while 1 i  imposes VRS to the linear program.  
 
The BoD model corresponds to a DEA approach where the vector of inputs corresponds to a 
vector with only ones. It was first introduced by Melyn and Moesen (1991). It is clear that the 
BoD model exploits the attractive features of DEA in that it allows for an endogenous weight 
selection. The interpretation of estimated scores is similar to DEA. For the notational 
representation of the BoD model, see Cherchye et al. (2007).  
 
Exogenous characteristics beyond WU managers’ control influence the inputs use, output 
production and, consequently, utilities’ efficiency (and effectiveness). Their influence can be 
revealed by various approaches (see Coelli et al., 2005 for a discussion). This paper uses the 
double bootstrap procedure. The latter implicitly assumes a separability condition between the 
production inputs and outputs space (in the first bootstrap procedure) and the environmental 
variables space (in the second bootstrap procedure) such that the latter does not influence the 
shape of the technology frontier but the mean and variance of the inefficiency process.  
 
The double bootstrap procedure first smoothes the irregularly bounded densities of observed input 
and output vectors and second the technology frontier. Both (first and second) bootstrap 
procedures are outlined in detail in Simar and Wilson (2007). They yield consistent inference of 
approximated estimators (Kneip et al., 2008). The use of the bootstrap procedure especially in the 
second step regression helps to improve parameter estimates such as the confidence intervals’ 
coverage especially, in finite samples. To avoid extra computational difficulties linked for 
example, to the curse of dimensionality problem (slow convergence rates with increased input 






3 Empirical model specification 
3.1 Input, output and quality variables 
The model specification relies on two output measures: water supply service coverage (measured 
in terms of the population served with piped water) and the volumetric water sold. The latter is 
highly correlated with utility revenues that are supposedly reinvested in advancing (to new 
costumers) and maintaining (for existing customers) service coverage. Output increases are 
expected to positively influence utilities’ technical efficiency (and effectiveness). Table 1 
presents some summary statistics. The data correspond to 21 African countries that are equivalent 
to about 60 percent of all countries whose urban WU managers or administrators responded to the 
WOP-Africa self assessment and benchmarking questionnaires by 2006.  
 
On average, about 1,463,981 customers are served with piped water systems. The utility with the 
lowest customer coverage serves about 48 percent of its licensed target total population (about 
one twenty one thousand customers) while that with the highest coverage serves about 51 percent 
of its total population. The highest performing utility in this partial productivity dimension sells 
about 112 times more water than the lowest performing utility (see Table 1).  
 
We consider two inputs: the total number of employees and the water distribution mains length 
(network length). The inputs capture utilities’ labor and capital expenditure, respectively. 
However, since the WOP dataset does not provide disaggregated employee categories (full or part 
time, technical or administrative), we use the aggregated employee count that implicitly assumes 
uniform skill distribution across observed WUs. The average utility employs 748 persons. The 
utility with the most employees hires about 3,139 persons while that with the lowest employees 
engages 95 persons. Among other capital input measures, water distribution network length is 
less prone to country-specific measurement and exchange rate incompatibilities. The utility with 
the longest piped water system built a water distribution main that is about 300 times longer than 
the utility with the shortest piped water system. 
 
 
Table 1: African urban water utilities summary statistics, 2006 
 Obs Mean StDev Maximum Minimum 
Input variables 
   Employees (numbers) 51 748 736 3139 95 
   Network length (meters)*1000 51 2,113.748 2,875.012 12,575.000 42.000 
Output variables 
   Population served with piped water*1000 51 1,463.981 1,751.622 9,361.760 121.081 
   Water sold (cubic meters/year)*100000 51 374.12208 439.30290 2,000 17.88500 
Quality variables 
   Total piped water connections*1000 51 114.105 153.773 650.504 9.076 
   Daily water supply hours 51 19 7 24 4 
Sub-indicators 
   Population served/Target population 51 0.695 0.229 1 0.249 
   Water sold/Target population 51 26.26 23.95 97.30 1.51 
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   Total water connections/Target population 51 0.081 0.086 0.307 0.004 
Environmental variables 
   Independent regulation (IR, dummy) 51 0.294 0.460 1 0 
   Performance contract use (PC, dummy) 51 0.628 0.488 1 0 
   GDP 51 0.257 0.269 1 0.051 
   Network density 51 0.065 0.049 0.286 0.015 
Abbreviations: Obs: Observations; StDev: Standard deviation; GDP: Gross domestic product per capita purchasing power parity; 





In addition to this basic model (hereafter referred to as Model 1), we consider different output 
quality variables. Previous literature (see Annex 1) considered the latter in the form of chemical 
treatment tests (Antonioli and Filippini, 2001; Corton, 2003; Lin, 2005; Lin and Berg, 2008), 
quality indexes (Saal and Parker, 2000: 2001; Woodbury and Dollery, 2004; Erbetta and Cave, 
2007; Bottasso and Conti, 2009), service coverage (Lin, 2005), service continuity (Corton, 2003; 
Lin, 2005; Lin and Berg, 2008), accounted-for water ratio (Lin, 2005), unaccounted-for water 
(Antonioli and Filippini, 2001; Garcia and Thomas, 2001; Tupper and Resende, 2004; Picazo-
Tadeo et al., 2008), annual mains breakage per observed output (Bhattacharyya et al., 1994), 
bathing water intensity (Saal et al., 2007) and household ratio (Mizutani and Urakami, 2001). 
 
This paper captures utilities-output quality in terms of services connectivity and continuity. We 
use the total active piped water connections to proxy the former. Earlier WU efficiency studies 
have treated water connections variedly. Assuming a cost minimization objective, utilities’ water 
connections have previously been used as a proxy for capital input (see Estache and Kouassi, 
2002; Lin, 2005; Lin and Berg, 2008), utilities output (see Ashton, 2000a: 2000b; Estache and 
Rossi, 2002; García-Sánchez, 2006; Saal et al., 2007), operational scale (see for example Erbetta 
and Cave, 2007) and to capture the impact of utilities operational environment on cost efficiency 
(see for example Teeples and Glyer, 1987).  
 
Holding inputs fixed we argue that to supply non-contaminated water, piped water distribution 
systems matter. This is importantly so for regions like Africa where universal urban water 
services coverage and increased mortality rates (owing especially to high water borne/water 
related diseases) are key developmental challenges. Using the case of India, Jalan and Ravallion 
(2003) found piped water delivery positively and significantly associated with reduced prevalence 
and duration of water borne diseases (e.g., diarrhea). As the safety of alternative urban non-piped 
water distribution systems is not always guaranteed and can consequently accrue costs to affected 
customers, we use dissimilar to earlier studies, the number of active piped water connections as a 
proxy for utilities output quality.  
 
To capture services continuity, we use utilities daily hours of service provision. For connected 
customers, however, utilities can only provide water supply services for a maximum of 24 hours. 
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As such, the variable is by construction restricted (between 0 and 24). To avoid imposing such a 
restriction to the DEA linear program, we adjust the output quality variable to take into account 
hours of daily water supply per connection. We therefore use the product of the daily hours of 
service provision and total piped water connections to capture utilities’ service continuity. We 
consider service connectivity as a quality variable in Model 2. The smallest performing WU 
makes 9076 piped water connections (serving about 742,000 customers). This is 72 times less 
than the utility with the highest number of connections (650,504 but serving about 4,134,000 
customers) within its licensed jurisdiction.  
 
Model 3 includes service continuity. Constant service continuity for connected customers is 
associated with improved public health among other socio-economic advancements. The average 
observed utility provides daily piped water services over 19 hours (see Table 1).  
 
 
3.2 Environmental variables 
Often, urban WUs fail to reach their performance targets due to country specific (e.g., national 
income), sector specific (e.g., adopted regulatory structure) and/or utility specific (e.g., customer 
density) factors. In an attempt to explain this inability, we identify four environmental factors that 
potentially influence utilities’ performance (technical efficiency and/or effectiveness). First, 
urban water supply is highly capital intensive. The lower the national per capita income, the 
lower the abilities to pay for public services, the less accrued returns are allocated for capital 
(re)investment and, the more exclusive water service provision becomes. Wealthier economies 
are more likely to (i) subsidize water infrastructure investments and (ii) maintain strong 
regulatory institutions (Franceys and Gerlach, 2008). To capture these country-specific 
differences, we use the gross domestic product per capita purchasing power parity (hereafter, 
GDP) indicator (WDI and GDF, 2010).  Across observed countries, GDP is on average 3,431$ 
(i.e., 25.7 percent7, see Table 1). Gabon is the wealthiest country (GDP = 13,349$) in the sample, 
while Malawi is the poorest with a GDP value of 681.37$. 
 
Second, regulation (largely economic regulation) is often adopted in the form of either formal 
(licenses) or informal (sector-specific commitments) rules. Strict regulatory systems (in the form 
of independent regulation) potentially results in increased regulatory risks (new expensive 
standards, tariffs) or sector credibility that respectively, augment sector uncertainty or/and 
investments (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). The WOP-Africa dataset distinguishes two main types of 
utilities: those regulated by an independent regulator and those regulated by the use of 
performance contracts (WSP-WB, 2009). In Africa, independent regulatory structures are 
commonly established solely for the water sector (e.g., in Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia) or 
                                                 
7 Countries GDPPPP values are normalized (as a share of the maximum GDPPPP value across observed African 
countries in 2006). 
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conjointly with other sectors including energy, telecommunications, waste removal and gas 
development sectors for example in Burundi, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, 
Tanzania and Rwanda (see MWI, 2002; NWASCO, 2004; Oelmann, 2007; Osumanu, 2008; 
URT, 2009; Mwanza, 2010). By 2006, about 29 percent of the observed urban water sectors in 
Africa had adopted independent regulatory institutions (see Table 1).8  
 
Regulation by contracts (e.g., in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon and Senegal) is commonly 
organized within a ministerial department or an asset holding agency and overseen by an 
independent committee (AfDB-WPP, 2010; MWR, 2001). About 63 percent of the observed 
urban water sectors had introduced regulation by performance contracts by 2006 (see Table 1). 
We use two dummy variables (i) independent regulation and, (ii) performance contract use to 
capture these potential reverse causalities between utilities performance and regulatory strictness 
(at the sector level).  
 
Thirdly, among other ways by which WUs can respond to customer demands for increased 
quality services provision is by augmenting the number of customers (population served) per 
mains length. Nonetheless, since all observed utilities provide services to urban populations that 
are more or less homogeneously populated (per square kilometer), we consider the influence of 
utilities’ network densities (rather than customer densities) on their performance. To capture these 
network density economies at the utility level, we use the number of piped water connections per 
unit network length. On average, most observed WUs in Africa connect 6.5 percent of their 
population per unit network length. The smallest performing WU makes about 1.5 percent water 
connections per its established piped water distribution system (see Table 1). 
 
 
3.3 Stepwise model  
In assessing utilities’ performance, we define a step-wise empirical model consisting of four 
steps. In step 1, we estimate utilities’ technical efficiency (output expansion) under given 
resource constraints. Here, we rely on the input and output variables detailed in section 3.1 and 
the DEA-VRS model outlined in section 2. 
 
Given unit input on one hand, utility managers seek to attain various effectiveness targets within 
their licensed service areas. They are supposed to serve as many customers with quality water 
systems, sell as much water, connect as many customers and provide reliable services for 
connected customers. Across observed WUs, 70 percent of the target population within utilities 
                                                 
8 Mwanza (2010) advocates for the creation of independent statutory regulatory agencies in Africa based on (i) clear 
legislative frameworks free from ministerial control, (ii) transparent procedures for appointing the board of directors, 
commissioners and key staff, (iii) secure tenure for elected oversight members remunerated based on private salary 
structures, (iv) sustainable finances through a regulatory fee charged on the regulated utilities, and (v) depolicized 
reporting mechanisms for the elected oversight members. 
12 
 
licensed jurisdictions are served with quality water supply systems (see Table 1). On average, 
observed utilities are able to sell about 26 cubic meters of water per customer per annum (though 
some water is often lost along the distribution system) and make about 81 connections by 1,000 
inhabitants (see Table 1). To meet these effectiveness goals for all customers within their licensed 
jurisdictions, utility managers need not only to perform better in one of the targets, but in all of 
them.  
 
To aggregate the different effectiveness targets, one can use the prices of the sub-indicators as 
weights. In addition (or alternatively), one could seek experts’ opinion on the exact significance 
attached to all identified sub-indicators. Such price and/or subjective value information can then 
be used in defining the lower and upper bounds between which each of the identified sub-
indicator can be allowed to vary. This kind of aggregation helps to enhance the resultant 
performance indexes’ discriminatory power, credibility and acceptability among related sector 
stakeholders. Thanassoulis et al. (2004) and Nardo et al. (2005) provide an overview of diverse 
aggregation techniques.  
 
For most public service sectors however, only sub-indicator’s quantitative information is 
(consistently) available. In other cases, it is not a guarantee that a consensual point is attained 
regarding the exact sub-indicator’s weights (Cherchye et al., 2007). To avoid such risks, we rely 
in a second step, on the BoD weighting approach (Cherchye et al., 2007). The BoD framework 
allows each utility to freely (and endogenously) choose non-negative weights for all selected sub-
indicators that maximize its eventual effectiveness performance relative to other observed 
utilities. As such, specific utilities’ poor performance can only be blamed on the particular self-
selected BoD weights rather than on some a priori defined (often unfair or non-consensual, etc) 
sub-indicator weighting system (Shwartz et al., 2010). By construction, resultant performance 
indexes (bounded between 0 and 1) only reflect utilities ‘achievement’ given unit input9 - that is, 
“without explicit reference to the inputs that are used in achieving such performance” (Cherchye 
et al., 2007). BoD values of one imply 100 percent effectiveness while values near to (far from) 
one denote high (or low) effectiveness, relative to the benchmark utilities located on the best-
practice effectiveness frontier.  
 
On the other hand and due to inefficiencies, utilities could fail to attain 100 percent effectiveness. 
Or vice versa, ineffective supply could foster a higher efficiency. To examine this relationship we 
use in a third step, the ratio of utilities’ effectiveness (BoD) by technical efficiency (TE). We 
refer to this ratio as the utilities ‘Potential Input Capacity’ (PIC).  
 
Consider in Figure 1 (i.e., Fig 1a to1c) utilities ‘A’ and ‘B’. Figure 1a presents the technical 
efficiency of the observations. It is presented in an output-oriented framework where we 
                                                 
9 This is unlike normal DEA problems where existing input resources are taken into account. 
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normalized the inputs. Observation ‘A’ is clearly more efficient than observation ‘B’, although 
not as efficient as its best practice. Therefore, observation ‘A’ and ‘B’ are located below the best 
practice frontier. Figure 1b presents the effectiveness of the two observations. Here, the outputs 
are presented relatively to the unit input (i.e., the BoD framework). Both observations are as 
effective.  
 
Figure 1c presents the PIC ratio. The ratio of effectiveness to technical efficiency equals to the 
distances OABoD/OATE and OBBoD/OBTE, respectively for ‘A’ and ‘B’. This ratio is denoted, 
respectively, by the distances OAPIC (utility A) and OBPIC (utility B), see Fig 1c. Given a priori 
defined output target (to serve all the target population within each utilities’ jurisdiction), the ratio 
indicates to what extent utilities potentially use available input resources (capital, labor, etc) to 
reach the target. 
 
PIC values of less than one indicate resources deficiency. Affected utilities need more input 
resources to attain 100 percent effectiveness (reflected by the distance S for utility A in Fig 1c). 
For utilities with a PIC value < 1, ineffectiveness is a more serious issue than inefficiency. PIC 
values larger than one denote utilities’ excess use of resources. That is, if the specific utilities 
were technical efficient, they would reach their targets with less input resources (reflected by the 
distance V for utility B in Fig 1c). For these utilities with PIC > 1, inefficiency is a larger problem 
than ineffectiveness. PIC values equal to one indicate exact resource allocation for observed 



















Abbreviations: TE, x, BoD, PIC and y: As earlier defined; z: Variable representing the ratio of population 
served and volumetric water sold over target population (see Section 3.3). 
Fig 1a: Technical Efficiency 
TE, x is given 
Fig 1b: Benefit of the Doubt 
BoD, x = 1 
Fig 1c: Potential Input Capacity 
















In a fourth and final step, we explore different inefficiency and ineffectiveness determinants. 
Unlike earlier studies that relied on the traditional two-step approach (where an environmental 
variable is regressed on the estimated efficiency scores), we use the double bootstrap procedure 
such that we correct for the measurement bias in the estimates (see Simar and Wilson, 2007 for an 
extensive discussion). Note that this fourth step allows us to indicate correlations between 
efficiency, effectiveness and environmental variables. Although not explicitly stated below, this 
does not allow us to draw causal interpretations. Figure 2 illustrates the four steps.  
 
 





4 Water utilities efficiency and effectiveness 
Table 2 presents the results of the analyses. Through the three model specifications (see section 
3.1), utilities are observed to be more effective than efficient. On average, technical efficiency 
across the three model specifications amounts to 70% (when no output quality variables are 
considered), 63% (when service connectivity variables are considered) and 68% (when service 
continuity variables are considered). Effectiveness amounts in the three specifications to 71%, 
73% and 71%, respectively. A quarter of the observed utilities have the possibility to increase 
their effectiveness by 44 percent and technical efficiency by 51 percent. The latter, through the 
three model specifications, is equivalent to about 56 (Model 1), 49.1 (Model 2) and 48.8 (Model 
3) percent. This implies that, when a quarter of the observed utilities is considered, utilities are 
* Besides this basic model specification, two output quality (service connectivity and adjusted service continuity) 
variables are considered respectively, in Models 2 and 3 (see Section 3.1).  
1. Efficiency analysis 
Inputs: Employees, network length 
Outputs: Service coverage, water sales* 
2. Effectiveness analysis by Benefit of the Doubt 
Used ratios of similar (to the technical efficiency 
analysis) output variables with utilities target population 
within their licensed jurisdictions. 
3. Potential Input Capacity analysis (PIC) 
(Benefit of the Doubt/Technical efficiency) 
4. Environmental factors analysis  
(See section 3.2) 
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found to be less technical inefficient and ineffective only when service continuity quality 
variables are considered.   
 
As the average hides some information, we focus on the different quartiles of the efficiency 
distribution. In model 1, technical efficiency of the third quartile amounts to 80%. This decreases 
to 71% in model 2 and to 76% in model 3. However, effectiveness results do not show this 
pattern. Utilities effectiveness stays around 87% in all the three model specifications.  
 
From the potential input capacity levels (PIC), we learn that the utilities (across the three model 
specifications) face more inefficiency than ineffectiveness problems. This implies that, if 
observed utilities would have been technical efficient, they would attain 100 percent effectiveness 
with less resources (inputs). As such, they do not need any additional resources to reach their 
effectiveness targets but a reduction of their existing inputs. The latter corresponds to about 2.4 
percent (Model 1), 15.9 percent (Model 2) and 4.9 percent (Model 3). Note that, these PIC 
estimates are based on the underlying mean values thus, they do not necessarily correspond to the 
ratio of estimated TE and BoD means. 
 
Across the three model specifications, technical efficiency is positively and significantly 
correlated with effectiveness only in the model without output quality variables (correlation of 
.29, p-value 0.0369) and if service continuity quality variables are considered (.44, p-value 
0.0014). While the relation is not very strong, an increase in technical efficiency is potentially 
allied with an increase in effectiveness. 
 
 
Table 2:  Utilities technical efficiency, effectiveness and potential input capacity estimates 







Mean 0.696 0.713 1.024 
Median 0.576 0.682 1.155 
Quartile 1 0.437 0.557 1.005 
Quartile 3 0.796 0.868 1.454 
Maximum 0.896 0.971 5.023 
Minimum 0.156 0.228 0.254 
 






Mean 0.626 0.726 1.159 
Median 0.619 0.681 1.248 
Quartile 1 0.509 0.547 0.906 
Quartile 3 0.706 0.885 1.399 
Maximum 0.871 0.968 20.413 
Minimum 0.038 0.229 0.263 
 






Mean 0.677 0.710 1.049 
Median 0.664 0.676 1.139 
Quartile 1 0.512 0.562 0.870 
Quartile 3 0.755 0.869 1.319 
Maximum 0.900 0.968 2.959 
Minimum 0.220 0.230 0.255 
TE: Technical efficiency; BoD: Effectiveness; PIC: Potential input capacity. All estimates are weighted by the population served. 
*For all models (1-3), similar 51 WUs are observed. Model 1 corresponds to network length and employees as inputs; and 
coverage and water sales as outputs. Models 2 and 3 add respectively, service connectivity and continuity as outputs to Model 1.  
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4.1 Regional performance 
To identify regional patterns, we explore in Table 3 regional utility-performance differences. 
Across the three model specifications, East African urban WUs (such as from Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda) are more technical inefficient than ineffective. Given their existing resources, 
these utilities can expand their outputs by 45 percent, 39 percent and 38 percent along model 1 to 
3, respectively (see Table 3). Nonetheless, to entirely penetrate their licensed markets (i.e., 
completely attain their effectiveness targets for all population within their licensed jurisdictions) 
these utilities should increase their effectiveness (across the three model specifications) by 38 
percent. Such performance improvement will demand no additional input usage (signaled 
respectively through the three models by PIC values of more than one). 
 
Looking at both South African (including Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia) 
and West African (such as Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria) utilities, 
analogous conclusions are observed. Like their East African counterparts, these utilities seem less 
ineffective than technically inefficient. As indicated by their PIC values of more than one, 
observed utilities can indeed attain increased performance (100 percent effectiveness) with fewer 
resources than their present amounts. Input excess of about 35 and 16 percent across the three 
model specifications for the two regions respectively, is on average observed.  
 
Through the three model specifications, South African utilities are the best performing - both in 
terms of effectiveness and technical efficiency. They are followed by (when only Models 2 and 3 
results are considered) the East African and finally the West African utilities (see Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3: Mean performance estimates per region  
 Region TE BoD PIC 




East Africa  0.556 0.623 1.456 
Central Africa** 0.735 0.580 0.790 
South Africa  0.586 0.805 1.520 
West Africa  0.588 0.599 1.140 
 




East Africa  0.607 0.625 2.564 
Central Africa** 0.655 0.604 0.922 
South Africa  0.644 0.810 1.300 
West Africa  0.550 0.604 1.168 
 




East Africa  0.617 0.629 1.068 
Central Africa** 0.705 0.604 0.857 
South Africa  0.669 0.794 1.233 
West Africa  0.575 0.597 1.161 
* For all models (1-3), similar 51 WUs are observed. TE, BoD and PIC: As earlier defined.  







4.2 Explaining utility performance differences 
To explain efficiency and effectiveness differences, the following specification is estimated (in a 
similar vein as in Simar and Wilson, 2007): 
 
i   density NetworkGDPPCIRiWUperf   4321                            [4] 
 
Where WUperfi denotes WUi’s performance in terms of efficiency or effectiveness, and 4321 ,,,  
represent the estimated marginal effects on utilities’ performance of the regulation (independent 
or not - IR), the use of performance contracts (PC),10 gross domestic product per capita 
purchasing power parity (GDP) and utilities network density.  
 
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.11 Only countries’ GDP is found to positively and 
significantly correlate to technical efficiency especially when service connectivity and continuity 
variables are considered (see Table 4). An increase by US$ 1,000 of a specific country’s GDP 
(say from US$ 2,420 to US$ 3,420) is significantly associated with a technical efficiency increase 
of 9.75 and 11.2 (i.e., when Models 2 and 3 results are considered, respectively). These particular 
findings are consistent with De Witte and Marques (2009). Using non-parametric envelopment 
techniques, the authors explored 122 urban WUs in Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, 
United Kingdom (England and Wales) and found a positive correlation between utilities technical 
efficiency and regional wealth per capita (measured in gross regional product per capita).  
 
The use of stricter regulatory systems (independent regulation) correlates positively with utilities’ 
technical efficiency.12 This is only significant when service connectivity variables are considered. 
Previous literature provides mixed results on the correlation between utilities’ efficiency and the 
kind of adopted regulatory structure. Anwandter and Ozuna (2002) found an insignificant link 
between autonomous (independent) regulation and urban WUs efficiency. They observed a 
sample of 110 utilities in Mexico in 1995. Similar results were observed by Kirkpatrick et al. 
(2006) on a sample of 14 African urban WUs in 2000. On the other hand, and based on 211 and 
10 urban WUs in Wisconsin and, England and Wales respectively, Aubert and Reynaud (2005) 
and Fabrizio and Martin (2007) found analogous positive and significant correlation between 
regulation and efficiency.13 In our case, a 1 percent increase in independent regulation is 
significantly associated with a 9.7 percent increase in technical efficiency (i.e., when Model 2 
                                                 
10 We carefully examined the existence of any multicollinearity between regulation and the use of performance 
contracts, but found no evidence. 
11 To examine the robustness of our results, we explored in different models the influences of additional country-
specific (including political stability and corruption levels), sector-specific (such as, annual sector reports availability) 
and utility-specific (including utility ownership and scale economies) variables. While their influences are insignificant, 
estimated utility performance scores remain largely unchanged. 
12 A sub-sample with either regulation or the use of performance contracts yields similar results.  
13 See also, Erbetta and Cave, 2007 and the reference therein. 
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results are considered). Other control variables (use of performance contracts and network 
density) yield insignificant influences on utilities technical efficiency (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Technical efficiency determinants  
Variable Model 1** Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.514 (0.082)*** 0.439 (0.063) *** 0.483 (0.067)*** 
Independent regulation (dummy) 0.015 (0.089) 0.097 (0.057) * 0.008 (0.070) 
Performance contract use (dummy) -0.045 (0.076) 0.043 (0.053) 0.026 (0.060) 
GDP 0.197 (0.127) 0.236 (0.086)*** 0.271 (0.094)*** 
Network density 0.613 (0.759) 0.702 (0.604) 0.780 (0.502) 
Note: Standard error between brackets; * and *** denote respectively, statistical significance at 10 and 1 percent.  




Repeating the double bootstrap procedure on the effectiveness scores yields slightly different 
estimates. The results are presented in Table 5. A 1% increase in countries’ GDP is positively and 
significantly linked to a more than 30 percent increase (on average across the model 
specifications) in utilities effectiveness. Interestingly, network density is found negatively 
correlated with utilities’ effectiveness. This finding is, however, insignificant through the three 
model specifications. Though lower influences (compared to the estimated influence on utilities 
technical efficiency) are on average observed across the three specifications of about 4.4 percent, 
higher network densities are found to be good for technical efficiency improvement, but at the 
expense of reduced effectiveness. This can especially be the case when customers are sparsely 
located across specific utilities’ licensed jurisdictions.  
 
The remaining exogenous factors (independent regulation and use of performance contracts) are 
found to positively but insignificantly influence utilities’ effectiveness (see Table 5).  
 
 
Table 5: Effectiveness determinants  
Variable Model 1*  Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.542 (0.076) *** 0.541 (0.078) *** 0.539 (0.076) *** 
Independent regulation (dummy) 0.008 (0.070) 0.018 (0.069) 0.023 (0.070) 
Performance contract use (dummy) 0.092 (0.064) 0.089 (0.063) 0.080 (0.060) 
GDP 0.326 (0.122)*** 0.340 (0.121)*** 0.319 (0.119) *** 












5 Conclusion and policy advice 
This paper explored the use of benchmarking techniques in facilitating informed policy decisions 
across the African urban water sector. Using the double bootstrap procedure in a step-wise model 
approach, technical efficiency scores were first estimated and compared across different model 
specifications. The first (basic) specification ignored output quality variables. The second and 
third specification took into account both service connectivity (in terms of active piped water 
connections) and service continuity factors (measured in daily hours of water supply).  
 
Second, a utility’s effectiveness levels were explored and unbundled from inefficiency in a third 
step. In the latter step, we used the ratio of utilities’ effectiveness to technical efficiency to 
understand the key reasons behind utilities poor performance (due to either inefficiency or 
ineffectiveness) and the extent to which observed utilities utilize available resources to reach their 
effectiveness targets. We referred to this ratio as the ‘potential input capacity’ (PIC). PIC values 
of less than, more than or equal to one denote utilities’ resources deficiency, excess use of input 
resources (due to higher inefficiency than ineffectiveness problems) and, exact resource 
allocation. Finally, possible influences of country, sector and utility-specific environmental 
variables on utilities’ technical efficiency (and effectiveness) levels were explored.  
 
The results pointed out that most utilities faced more inefficiency than ineffectiveness problems 
(PIC values > 1). Consequently, if the utilities would have been performing as efficiently as the 
best practice observations, they would achieve their effectiveness targets with fewer resources. To 
provide water supply services to all the population within their licensed jurisdiction and attain 
100 percent effectiveness, these utilities would not need any additional resources. 
 
Across the African region, no major performance differences were observed. Utilities across the 
East, West and Southern African regions seemed less ineffective than technically inefficient. To 
fully penetrate their markets, these utilities would need to reduce their input use (as evident from 
their PIC values of more than one). Nonetheless, South African utilities are the most well 
performing (both effectively and efficiently) followed by (i.e., when both service connectivity 
and continuity variables are considered) the East African and the West African utilities. 
 
Only countries’ economic development (measured in terms of the gross domestic product per 
capita purchasing power parity) is positively and significantly linked to utilities technical 
efficiency and effectiveness. Network density correlates positively to utilities’ technical 
efficiency but negatively influences utilities’ effectiveness. This is, however, insignificant across 
the three model specifications. Independent regulation is positively found linked to utilities’ 
technical efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, this is only significant when service 




Despite the fact that the paper been based on correlations and thus does not provide causal 
relationships, it offers some clear insights for policy. First, the paper confirms that efficiency and 
effectiveness are not a trade-off. Water utilities can improve their effectiveness by increasing 
their efficiency. To do so, they should learn from best practices. Second, utility regulators, 
managers and policy makers should carefully take into account both efficiency and effectiveness 
performance indicators. This paper provided one way of disentangling ineffectiveness from 
inefficiency. Lastly, national economic advancement matters for utilities’ efficiency and 
effectiveness improvement. International organizations such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations should thus foster the wealth of countries. This in turn will improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public service utilities.   
 
We see various avenues of further research. First, the availability of complete operational data 
(both quantity and cost data) would permit the extension of this study to explore other kinds of 
efficiency (including cost and allocative efficiencies) and effectiveness measures. Second, despite 
this first study, a better understanding of the complex relationship between efficiency and 
effectiveness is needed. Therefore, it would be insightful to apply the proposed step-wise model 
to other sectors and other continents. Third, the paper at hand provides some first steps in 
explaining the drivers of effectiveness. Further research is needed to explore the influence of 
quality indicators, political economy variables as well as management structures. A final 
promising avenue for further research consists of extending the cross-sectional setting to panel 




AfDB-WPP (African Development Bank Water Partnership Program). (2010). Water sector 
governance in Africa: Theory and practice (Vol. 1). Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank 
Water Partnership Program. 
Antonioli, B., and Filippini, M. (2001). The use of a variable cost function in the regulation of the 
Italian water industry. Utilities Policy, 10(3-4): 181-187. 
Anwandter, L., and Ozuna, T. (2002). Can public sector reforms improve the efficiency of public 
water utilities? Environment and Development Economics, 7(04): 687-700. 
Ashton, J. (2000a). Total factor productivity growth and technical change in the water and 
sewerage industry. Service Industries Journal, 20 (4): 121–130.  
Ashton, J. (2000b). Cost efficiency in the UK water and sewerage industry. Applied Economics 
Letters, 7 (7): 455-458. 
Aubert, C., and Reynaud, A. (2005). The impact of regulation on cost efficiency: An empirical 
analysis of Wisconsin water utilities. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 23(3): 383-409. 
Banker, D. (1984). Estimating most productive scale size using data envelopment analysis. 
European Journal of Operational Research, 17(1): 35-44. 
Berg, S. (2007). Conflict resolution: benchmarking water utility performance. Public 
Administration and Development, 27(1): 1-11.  
Bhattacharyya, A., Parker, E., and Raffiee, K. (1994). An examination of the effect of ownership 
on the relative efficiency of public and private water utilities. Land Economics, 70(2): 197-209. 
Bogetoft, P., and Otto, L. (2011). Benchmarking with DEA, SFA, and R. USA: Springer 
Science+Business Media, LLC. 
Bottasso, A., and Conti, M. (2009). Price cap regulation and the ratchet effect: A generalized 
index approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 32(3): 191-201. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W., and Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
units. European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6): 429-444.  
Cherchye, L., Moesen, W., Rogge, N and Puyenbroeck, T. (2007). An introduction to ‘Benefit of 
the Doubt’ composite indicators. Social Indicators Research, 82 (1): 111-145. 
Coelli, T., Rao, P., O’Donnell, C., and Battese, G. (2005). An introduction to efficiency and 
productivity analysis (2nd ed.). USA: Springer. 
Corton, M. (2003). Benchmarking in the Latin American water sector: the case of Peru. Utilities 
Policy, 11(3): 133-142. 
Daraio, C., and Simar, L. (2007). Advanced robust and nonparametric methods in efficiency 
analysis: Methodology and applications. USA: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 
22 
 
De Witte, K., and Marques, R. (2009). Designing performance incentives, an international 
benchmark study in the water sector. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 18(2): 
189-220. 
Erbetta, F., and Cave, M. (2007). Regulation and efficiency incentives: Evidence from the 
England and Wales water and sewerage industry. Review of Network Economics, 6 (4): 425 – 
452. 
Estache, A., and Kouassi, E. (2002). Sector organization, governance, and the inefficiency of 
African water utilities (Policy Research Working Paper No. 2890), The World Bank.  
Estache, A., and Rossi, M. ( How Different Is the Efficiency of Public and Private Water 
Companies in Asia? The World Bank Economic Review, 16 (1): 139 – 148. 
Fabrizio, E., and Martin, C. (2007). Regulation and efficiency incentives: Evidence from the 
England and Wales water and sewerage industry. Review of Network Economics, 6(4): 425-452.  
Farrell, M. (1957). The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series A (General), 120 (3): 253-290. 
Franceys, R., and Gerlach, E. (2008). Regulating water and sanitation for the poor: Economic 
regulation for public and private partnerships. United Kingdom: Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
Fried, H., Lovell, K., and Schmidt, S. (2008). The measurement of productive efficiency and 
productivity growth. USA: Oxford University Press. 
 
Garcia, S., and Thomas, A. (2001). The structure of municipal water supply costs: Application to 
a panel of French local communities. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 16(1): 5 - 29. 
García-Sánchez, I. (2006). Efficiency measurement in Spanish local government: The case of 
municipal water services. Review of Policy Research, 23(2): 355–372. 
Greene, W. (2008). The econometric approach to efficiency analysis. In Fried, H., Lovell, C., and 
Schmidt., S, The measurement of productive efficiency and productivity growth (pp. 92 - 250). 
New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 
Jalan, J., and Ravallion, M. (2003). Does piped water reduce diarrhea for children in rural India? 
Journal of Econometrics, 112(1): 153–173 
Kirkpatrick, C., Parker, D., and Zhang, Y. (2006). An empirical analysis of state and private-
sector provision of water services in Africa. The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1): 143 -163. 
Kneip, A., Simar, L., and Wilson, P. (2003). Asymptotics for DEA estimators in nonparametric 
frontier models (Technical report No. 0323). IAP Statistics Network. Interuniversity Attraction 
Pole, Belgium. 
Kneip, A., Simar, L., and Wilson, P. (2008). Asymptotics and consistent bootstraps for DEA 
estimators in nonparametric frontier models. Econometric Theory, 24(06): 1663-1697. 
23 
 
Lin, C. (2005). Service quality and prospects for benchmarking: Evidence from the Peru water 
sector. Utilities Policy, 13(3): 230-239. 
Lin, C., and Berg, S. (2008). Incorporating service quality into yardstick regulation: An 
application to the Peru water sector. Review of Industrial Organization, 32(1): 53-75. 
Lovell, K., Jesus, P., and Judi, T. (1995). Measuring macroeconomic performance in the OECD: 
A comparison of European and non-European countries. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 87 (3): 507-518. 
Madhoo, Y. (2007). International trends in water utility regimes. Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 78(1): 87-135. 
Melyn, W., and Moesen, W. 1991. Towards a synthetic indicator of macroeconomic performance: 
Unequal weighting when limited information is available. Public Economics Research Paper 17, 
K.U.Leuven Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Belgium. 
Mizutani, F., and Urakami, T. (2001). Identifying network density and scale economies for 
Japanese water supply organizations. Papers in Regional Science, 80(2): 211–230. 
MWI (Ministry of Water and Irrigation). (2002). Water Act, No 8. Republic of Kenya. 
Mwanza, D. (2010). Roles and institutional arrangements for economic regulation of urban water 
services in Sub-Saharan Africa (Doctoral thesis). Loughborough University, United Kingdom. 
MWR (Ministry of Water Resources). (2001).  Ethiopian water sector policy. The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Ministry of Water Resources. 
Nardo, M., Saisana,M., Saltelli, A., Tarantola, S., Hoffman, A., and Giovannini, E. (2005). 
Handbook on constructing composite indicators: Methodology and user guide. OECD Statistics 
Working Paper 2005/03, OECD Publishing. 
NWASCO (National Water Supply and Sanitation Council). (2004). Water sector reform in 
Zambia. The Republic of Zambia: National Water Supply and Sanitation Council. 
Oelmann, M. (2007). Assessment of the current regulatory practices of the Southern and East 
African water utilities regulators (Synthesis report of a meeting of African water utilities 
regulators). Lusaka, Zambia. 
Osumanu, I. (2008). Private sector participation in urban water and sanitation provision in Ghana: 
Experiences from the Tamale Metropolitan Area (TMA). Environmental Management, 42(1): 
102-110. 
Pestieau, P., and Tulkens, H. (1993). Assessing and explaining the performance of public 
enterprises”, FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 50 (3): 293-323. 
Picazo-Tadeo, A., Sáez-Fernández, F., and González-Gómez, F. (2008). Does service quality 
matter in measuring the performance of water utilities? Utilities Policy, 16(1): 30-38.  
24 
 
Saal, D., and Parker, D. (2000). The impact of privatization and regulation on the water and 
sewerage industry in England and Wales: a translog cost function model. Managerial and 
Decision Economics, 21(6): 253-268. 
Saal, D., and Parker, D. (2001). Productivity and price performance in the privatized water and 
sewerage companies of England and Wales. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 20(1): 61 - 90. 
Saal, D., Parker, D., and Weyman-Jones, T. (2007). Determining the contribution of technical 
change, efficiency change and scale change to productivity growth in the privatized English and 
Welsh water and sewerage industry: 1985–2000. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 28(1): 127 - 
139. 
Saisana, M., and Tarantola, S. (2002). State-of-the-art report on current methodologies and 
practices for composite indicator development. Institute for the Protection and Security of the 
Citizen Technological and Economic Risk Management, EC Joint Research Centre, Italy. 
Simar, L., and Wilson, P. (2007). Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric models 
of production processes. Journal of Econometrics, 136(1): 31-64. 
Shwartz, M., Burgess, J., and Berlowitz, D. (2010). Benefit-of-the-doubt approaches for 
calculating a composite measure of quality. Health Services and Outcomes Research 
Methodology, 9(4): 234-251. 
Teeples, R., and  Glyer, D. (1987). Cost of water delivery systems: specification and ownership 
effects. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69 (3): 399-408. 
Thanassoulis, E., Portela, M., and Allen, R. (2004). Incorporating Value Judgments in DEA. In 
Cooper, W., Seiford, L., and Zhu, J, Handbook on Data Envelopment Analysis, Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Tupper, H., and Resende, M. (2004). Efficiency and regulatory issues in the Brazilian water and 
sewage sector: An empirical study. Utilities Policy, 12(1): 29-40. 
UNESCO., and Earthscan. (2009). Water in a changing world: The United Nations world water 
development report 3. Paris, France and London, United Kingdom: United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization and Earthscan publishing. 
URT (United Republic of Tanzania). (2009). The water supply and sanitation Act, No. 12. Dar Es 
Salaam, The United Republic of Tanzania. 
UNSGAB (United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Board). (2006). Hashimoto action plan: 
Compendium of actions. United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and 
Sanitation. 
WDI (World Development Indicators)., and GDF (Global Development Finance). (2010). GDP 
per capita, PPP (current international $). 
http://search.worldbank.org/quickview?name=GDP+per+capita%2C+PPP+%28current+internati
onal+%24%29&id=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD&type=Indicators&qterm=purchasing+power+parity, 
Accessed June 2010. 
25 
 
WHO (World health Organization)., and UNICEF (The United Nations Children's Fund). (2000). 
Global water supply and sanitation assessment 2000 report. USA: World Health Organization 
and United Nations Children’s Fund. 
Woodbury, K., and Dollery, B. (2004). Efficiency measurement in Australian local government: 
The case of New South Wales municipal water services. Review of Policy Research, 21(5): 615-
636. 
WSP-WB (Water and Sanitation Program-Africa of the World Bank). (2009). Water operators 
partnership: Africa utility performance assessment. Nairobi, Kenya: The World Bank/UN 
Habitat/ESAR/AfWA. 
Yatchew, A. (1998), Nonparametric regression techniques in economics. Journal of Economic 












Annex 1: Quality variables used in urban water distribution efficiency studies 
Author  Urban WUs (period, place)  Technique Quality variable used Quality variable influence on efficiency 
Bhattacharyya et al., 1994 257 (1992,  North America) TGV cost function Mains breakdowns/output/year Increased inputs requirement 
Saal and Parker, 2000 10 (1985-1999, England and Wales) MO translog cost function 9 water quality measures* Quality-driven scope economies  
Antonioli & Filippini, 2001 32 (1991-1995, Italy) CD variable cost function Water losses, WSCtreatment Only WSCtreatment increases variable costs  
Garcia & Thomas, 2001 55 (1995-1997, France) GMM, translog cost function Network losses Increased input  requirement 
Saal & Parker, 2001 10 (1985-1999, England and Wales) Tornqvist indexes 9 water quality measures* Lower productivity post-privatization  
Mizutani & Urakami, 2001 112 (1994,  Japan) Log-linear, translog, hedonic function Purifier level, household ratio Better network and scale economies capture 
Corton, 2003 44 (1996-1998,  Peru) Regression techniques CL tests, SCty, WSCtreatment No significant impact on operation costs 
Tupper & Resende, 2004 20 (1996–2000, Brazil) DEA with tobit regression Water loss index Positive significant influence  
Woodbury & Dollery, 2004 73 (1998-2000,  Australia) DEA with tobit regression Water quality** & service*** indexes Minor variations in utilities efficiency 
Lin, 2005 198 (1996-2001,  Peru) Stochastic cost frontier AW ratio, CL tests, SCv, SCty Positive significant influence 
Saal et al., 2007 10 (1985-2000, England and Wales) GPP index Bathing water intensity Increased input  requirement 
Erbetta & Cave, 2007 10 (1993-2005, England and Wales) DEA, Stochastic frontier WU-specific DWQCI Better output caputure 
Lin & Berg, 2008 38 (1996-2001,  Peru) DEA, PSM and QMPI CL tests & SCty Positive influence 
Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2008 38 (2001,  Spain) Translog cost function Unaccounted-for water Positive influence 
Bottasso and Conti, 2009 10 (1995-2004, England and Wales) Translog cost function Water quality Lower productivity post-privatization 
*identified by Ofwat as key for aesthetic, health and cost-effectiveness reasons; **compliance with chemical, physical and microbiological requirements; ***constituting water quality and service complaints and, the average 
customer outage; WUs: Water utilities; TGV: Translog generalized variable; MO: Multiple output; CD: Cobb-Douglas; GPP: Generalized parametric productivity; DEA: Data envelopment analysis; CL tests: positive rate of chlorine 
tests; SCty: Service continuity; WSCtreatment: Water served receiving chemical treatment (percentage); GMM: Generalized method of moments; AW ratio: Accounted-for water ratio; SCv: Service coverage; DWQCI: Drinking 
water quality compliance index as defined by the Drinking Water Inspectorate and the Environment Agency in the UK; PSM: Preference structure model; QMPI: Quality-incorporated Malmquist Productivity index 
